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[fresh page][cn]2. [ct]The pluralism of European fundamental rights law 
 
[au]Kaarlo Tuori 
 
[a]1. THE FRAMEWORK: LEGAL PLURALISM AND PERSPECTIVISM 
 
[b]1.1 Polycentricity, Diversity and Pluralism 
 
European constitutional space – the geographical and social setting for European 
constitutional law – is a crowded space, in both the normative and institutional respect. 
It is occupied not only by state constitutional orders, watched over and implemented by 
state bodies of constitutional review, but also by two transnational constitutional orders, 
each supported by a constitutional court of its own. Many observers have seen in the 
situation prevailing in the European constitutional space a clear case of legal or, to be 
more specific, constitutional pluralism. But what, exactly, do we mean by legal 
pluralism and constitutional pluralism as its sub-species? Let me start with some 
conceptual remarks and clarifications. 
First, legal pluralism should be distinguished from what in Scandinavian 
debates has been called polycentricity of law. ‘Polycentricity’ refers to important 
developments in the doctrine of legal sources, which determines who is allowed to 
participate in the continuous discourse specifying the contents of the legal order and 
what weight the respective contributions carry. ‘Polycentricity’ connotes a 
multiplication of sources of law; the fact that new participants have been granted access 
to the discourse where the ever changing content of the legal order is determined.1 The 
focus of ‘polycentricity’ is on trends within a single legal order or system; it evokes a 
plurality of legal sources and not of legal orders or systems. 
Second, a conceptual distinction should be made between legal diversity and 
legal pluralism. Pluralism is not identical to but a special case of diversity. ‘Legal 
diversity’ refers to the mere coexistence of a plurality of legal orders or systems, 
without any implication of either harmonious or conflictual relations among them. 
                                                        
1 Henrik Zahle, ‘The polycentricity of the law or the importance of legal pluralism for legal dogmatics’ 
in Hanne Petersen and Henrik Zahle (eds), Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law 
(Farnham: Ashgate 1995) 185. 
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Thus, the black box model which, according to William Twining, has underpinned 
much of modern legal theory depicts legal diversity in terms of self-contained and self-
sufficient normative and institutional boxes.2 Legal diversity turns into legal pluralism 
when state law’s exclusive jurisdiction is challenged; when the legal space of a state is 
transformed into a hybrid space3 with plural claims of authority. 
Legal pluralism comes in two guises: as pluralism of either legal orders or legal 
systems, or, in other words, normative or systemic pluralism. The distinction between 
the two variants of legal pluralism is based on the distinction between two aspects of 
law. On the one hand, law is a symbolic-normative phenomenon, a legal order. On the 
other hand, it consists of specific social practices – legal practices – where the legal 
order is produced and reproduced. Legal practices take place in a particular institutional 
setting: law-making in parliament and government, adjudication in courts and legal 
scholarship at law faculties, to enumerate the primary practices of modern law. In my 
conceptual scheme, ‘legal system’ covers both of the law’s two dimensions: the legal 
order and institutionally framed legal practices.4 
In a pluralism of legal orders (normative pluralism), more than one legal order 
claims authority in the same legal space; that is, the same geographically delineated 
social space as the setting for law. Such a situation challenges not only the hierarchical 
view of the Kelsenian-Hartian variant of legal positivism but also the exclusivity of 
state law. Yet, the challenge need not be fatal, and state law may still retain its 
dominance. This is the case when state law defines the conditions for the authority and 
applicability of non-state law and when enforcement of the latter, too, falls to state 
courts.5 In turn, pluralism of legal systems (systemic pluralism) contests the exclusivity 
of not only the state legal order but of state legal institutions and practices as well. This 
occurs when non-state law, claiming authority in the territory of a state, possesses its 
own court-like, law-enforcing bodies. Evidently, this form of legal pluralism constitutes 
the gravest threat to the state-sovereigntist premises of the black box model. 
The concept of legal pluralism is a contribution of legal anthropologists. Yet, 
present legal pluralism is to a large extent a product of the fairly recent rise of 
                                                        
2 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press 2000). 
3 Paul Schiff Berman, ‘Global legal pluralism’ (2007) 80 S Cal L Rev 1155. 
4 I have developed a general view of law in my Critical Legal Positivism (Farnham: Ashgate 2002) and 
Ratio and Voluntas (Farnham: Ashgate 2011). 
5 See Ralf Michaels’ discussion of the alternatives for state law to acknowledge the significance of non-
state law. Ralf Michaels, ‘The re-state-ment of non-state law: The state, choice of law, and the challenge 
from global legal pluralism’ (2005) 51Wayne L Rev 1209. 
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transnational law. Transnational law, of which EU law is perhaps the most conspicuous 
epitome, has dealt the final deathblow to the black box model. Transnational law is law 
beyond the dichotomy of national and international law; it cannot be compressed into 
the compartments of the black-box model. In the black box model, legal systems and 
the reach of their respective claims of authority are differentiated along territorial 
criteria; within its territory, the claim to authority of the state legal system is universal 
and exclusive. It is universal in the sense of covering all substantive fields of regulation, 
and it is exclusive in the sense of not recognising any rival legal authority. By contrast, 
transnational law follows, not territorial, but functional or substantive criteria of 
differentiation. Its claim to authority is not universal in its scope but always limited to 
specific substantive fields. Yet, transnational law contests state law’s claim to both 
exclusivity and universality. Clashes arising from contradictory principles of attribution 
of legal authority seem inescapable: transnational law’s substantively limited claims 
contradict state law’s universal and exclusive claim. Rival legal orders or systems are 
competing for authority in the same legal space; a hybrid legal space, to use again the 
term coined by Paul Schiff Berman. 
In the hybrid European constitutional space, diversity has taken the decisive 
step into pluralism. Three fundamental rights orders claim authority, with two partly 
overlapping transnational orders contesting the exclusivity of national fundamental 
rights law. Each fundamental rights order is watched over by a distinct review 
mechanism, topped by, respectively, a national constitutional or supreme court, the 
European court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). What we can observe is not only normative but systemic pluralism, too. 
By contrast, the constellation among national constitutional orders does not 
amount to normative or systemic pluralism but remains ‘simple’ diversity; as a rule, 
member state fundamental rights orders do not claim authority within the legal space 
of other member states. However, the EU law principle of mutual recognition entails 
that national legal acts have legal effects in other member states, too, and attach a hint 
of pluralism to the horizontal relations among member state legal systems. Still, strictly 
speaking, here the pluralistic, potentially conflictual relationship prevails between EU 
law and the national law of the member state under the obligation drawn from the 
principle of mutual recognition, and only indirectly between the two member state legal 
systems. 
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The example of mutual recognition shows that even ‘simple’ legal diversity as 
such can become an issue for EU law. Member states may attach qualifications to 
recognising legal acts of other member states, similar to those that condition their 
acceptance of the primacy of EU law. More generally, overcoming problems which 
legal diversity in Europe creates for the functioning of the internal market and 
especially for free movement is a major – if not the major – objective of European 
integration as legal integration. EU constitutional law avails itself of specific legislative 
instruments and doctrinal means to surmount problems which diversity is deemed to 
cause for integration: directly effective Treaty provisions, directly applicable 
regulations and harmonising directives, all of them backed up by EU law’s primacy 
over conflicting national law. The principle of mutual recognition is the lightest weapon 
in this arsenal: it aims at the effects of diversity, not diversity itself. 
 
[b]1.2 Radical and Dialogical Pluralists 
 
Due to overlapping claims of authority, legal pluralism comes accompanied by the 
possibility of conflict. Hence, a conflictual approach seems a natural and legitimate 
choice for scholars of pluralism. This is the choice of radical pluralists who reject the 
very possibility of a peaceful solution to the fundamental clashes of authority latent in 
a hybrid legal space. Radical pluralists have been well represented in debates on 
European constitutional pluralism, too. Yet, radical pluralists do not monopolise the 
scholarly field. They are confronted by legal dialogists or dialogical pluralists who 
profess dialogue and striving for coherence before antagonism.6 Indeed, two sides exist 
to the relationship between overlapping legal orders or systems: on the one hand rivalry 
and conflict, and on the other hand mutual dialogue and accommodation. Arguably, 
dialogical pluralism and its presuppositions remain under-theorised in comparison with 
its radical counterpart. In the following, I try to vindicate my version of dialogism 
through an immanent criticism of one of the main strands of radical pluralism; namely, 
the Kelsenian one. 
                                                        
6 I would include in dialogical pluralists, among others, Neil Walker, Miguel Poiares Maduro and Mattias 
Kumm. See Neil Walker, ‘Late sovereignty in the European Union’ in Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in 
Transition (Hart Publishing 2003); Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Europe and the constitution: What if this is 
as good as it gets?’ in Joseph H.H. Weiler and Marlene Wind (eds), European Constitutionalism Beyond 
the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003). As a synthesis see Matej Avbelj and Jan 
Komàrek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2012). 
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 The Kelsenian position claims to articulate the internal perspective of legal 
actors. Kelsen maintains that every legal actor is bound to assume the existence of a 
Grundnorm which constitutes the ultimate basis of validity and cognoscibility of the 
legal order she is applying. Multiple interpretations exist of the nature of the 
Grundnorm, and Kelsen’s own accounts of its role vary as well. But a Kantian-
transcendental aspect, at least, is crucial to an understanding of the function of the 
Grundnorm in the pure theory of law. For Kelsen, the (tacit) assumption of a 
Grundnorm is a necessary precondition of all legal cognition and all judgments of legal 
validity; or, to put it in Gadamerian terms, an integral element of the Vorverständnis of 
legal actors. 
According to the Kelsenian account, each of the conflicting legal orders is 
subjected to its specific Grundnorm, which establishes its normativity and crowns its 
hierarchical structure of authority (validity). Contests of authority are bound to receive 
different solutions in legal systems deferring to different Grundnorms. What we 
encounter is an interpretation of the inevitability of legal perspectivism: no neutral 
ground exists where legal orders subordinated to diverse Grundnorms could meet, but 
the solution to the contested issue depends on the legal order from whose perspective 
it is approached. Now, so Kelsenian radical pluralists argue, institutional legal actors 
such as judges or legislators are bound to adopt the perspective of the legal order under 
which the institution they serve has been established and its powers defined, and whose 
norms they are expected to apply and uphold. Following this line of argument, it is 
inevitable that – to take an example related to our present topic – member state 
constitutional courts assess EU law’s claims of authority in light of the domestic 
constitution, whereas the CJEU treats EU law as an independent legal order and 
employs the constitutional criteria of this order. Kelsenian premises do not admit of any 
(legal) principle which could bridge the gulf between the perspectives of self-contained 
legal orders; what we have here is the black box model revisited.7 
The Kelsenian position is not the only variant of radical pluralism. Another one 
is based on Koskenniemi’s version of critical legal scholarship. Kelsenians and ‘crits’ 
might seem to be odd bedfellows. However, Koskenniemi cites with approval Kelsen’s 
                                                        
7 Neil MacCormick’s path-breaking articles from the 1990s, which in fact launched the still continuing 
debate on constitutional pluralism, largely adhered to the Kelsenian approach. See Neil MacCormick, 
Questioning Sovereignty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999). As a representative example of the 
approach, see also Theodor Schilling, ‘Autonomy of the Community legal order: An analysis of possible 
foundations’ (1996) 37 Harv Intl L J 389. 
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statement of the twin features of solipsism and imperialism, characterising especially 
those nation-state legal orders which subscribe to the monist doctrine in relations 
between municipal and international law. At the end of the day, this avowal of affinity 
is perhaps not so surprising, considering that ‘solipsism’ and ‘imperialism’ are apt 
descriptions of Koskenniemi’s portrayal of the antagonistic relations among 
international law regimes as well; notwithstanding the vast distance between Kelsen’s 
and Koskenniemi’s legal theoretical starting points.8 Conflicts of jurisdiction between 
rival legal regimes are irresolvable, not because of divergent Grundnorms, but because 
of divergent institutional biases and the irreconcilability of the strategic interests which 
the institutional actors of different regimes are pursuing; say, the CJEU, the ECtHR and 
national constitutional courts. 
 Both versions of radical pluralism are attentive to the inevitable perspectivism 
of law; an essential feature of all law but especially accentuated in the context of EU 
law. Kelsenians articulate legal perspectivism in terms of the attachment of legal actors 
to a particular Grundnorm, whereas for Koskenniemi the irreconcilable perspectivism 
derives from the irreconcilable strategic interests of legal actors and institutions in the 
power play of law. Both camps of radical pluralism draw extremist conclusions from 
legal perspectivism and, consequently, are able merely to see conflicts in the relations 
between diverse legal orders and systems. But another side exists to these relations, too: 
cross-border dialogue and striving for normative coherence. This is the aspect of our 
pluralist lawscape which Boaventura de Sousa Santos has caught in the concept of 
interlegality. In the mirror of interlegality, plural legal orders, systems or regimes do 
not appear as self-contained entities; they are seen as mutually overlapping and 
maintaining a dialogical relation with each other.9 
 Kelsen’s pure theory of law proposes a deficient view of legal actors’ 
Vorverständnis and the legal and constitutional culture that imbues it. Kelsen is right in 
stressing that a doctrine of legal sources which helps to identify valid legal norms is an 
essential part of this Vorverständnis. But through his leap into the transcendental, 
Kelsen ahistoricises historically highly variable cultural phenomena. As the debate on 
the increasing polycentricity of law, for instance, has shown, the doctrine of legal 
sources is not necessarily hierarchically structured, as Kelsen claims, nor does legal 
                                                        
8  Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International law: Constitutionalism, managerialism and the ethos of legal 
education’ (2007) 1 Eur J Intl J 1. 
9 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense (London: Butterworths 2002) 347. 
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cultural evidence support a thesis of the law’s immutable conceptual skeleton. Perhaps 
even more serious is Kelsen’s silence on the normative elements – legal principles – in 
legal culture and legal actors’ Vorverständnis. 
Still, even in its transcendental ahistoricity and substantive arbitrariness, Kelsen’s 
reconstruction gives us a clue as to how to perceive legal perspectivism and its impact 
on a pluralistic legal constellation. Kelsen maintains that the normative claims of legal 
speech acts are always made with reference to a specific legal order. For Kelsenians, 
this amounts to adherence to the Grundnorm of the legal order at issue, and this 
adherence accounts for the different views that the CJEU and national constitutional 
courts hold of the ultimate validity criteria of EU law. 
Legal actors’ dependence on a referential legal order should be understood in 
broader terms than merely as application of surface level normative material or the 
doctrine of legal sources determining the legal validity of that material. We should also 
be aware of the general role of legal culture in legal practices; the functioning of legal 
concepts, principles and theories as a filter through which surface level legal material 
is cognised and interpreted. Rejecting the Kelsenian reading of legal perspectivism does 
not imply denying that national courts are still in an important way bound to their 
national legal order. Judges in national courts have received their legal education in 
national universities and have accumulated their professional experience in the national 
judiciary; consequently, their legal pre-understanding is imbued by the national legal 
culture. Hence, we are entitled to assume, for instance, that judges in national courts 
approach and interpret EU law through their national legal culture: through the legal 
concepts, principles and theories inherent in that culture. And, if we regard legal culture 
as an integral part of the legal order – as I think we should – we can speak not only of 
diverse perspectives to European law but also of diverse European laws, cast in 
different legal-cultural moulds. 
Radical pluralists shut legal orders, systems and regimes in the solipsism of their 
particular perspectives imposed on them by their Grundnorms or by legal actors’ 
strategic interests. The radicals are not able to account for phenomena of interlegality 
or the aspect of uniformity which balances the perspectivist diversity of EU law. A 
cultural view of legal perspectivism can overcome these shortcomings. Differences in 
legal or constitutional culture do not negate the possibility of a common core in 
nationally differentiated traditions; a common legal or constitutional deep culture, 
which facilitates the interlegality evoked by Sousa Santos. 
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Despite European legal cultural diversity, EU law is still by and large interpreted 
and applied in approximately the same way in the member states. We may have 28 
diverse EU laws, impregnated by diverse national legal cultures, complemented by ‘EU 
law-EU law’ in the sense of EU law as seen from the particular perspective of EU law 
culture. Still these EU laws are sufficiently similar to make European integration 
possible. The necessary uniformity is guaranteed by European legal deep culture which 
nationally differentiated legal concepts, principles and doctrines manifest and specify. 
It bridges legal diversity and facilitates ongoing cross-border dialogue, which is such 
an essential feature of European interlegality. 
 
[a]2. EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PLURALISM 
 
[b]2.1 Lessons from Perspectivism 
 
As a token of legal perspectivism, every legal system defines itself its relations to other 
legal systems. No second-order master principle or ultimate institutional arbiter exists 
to guarantee the mutual compatibility of such definitions; hence the ever-present 
possibility of conflicts on which radical pluralists build their case. 
The inexorable legal perspectivism affects how one conceives of European 
fundamental rights pluralism. This can be approached from the point of view of each 
of the overlapping and rival fundamental rights laws. Again, no normative or procedural 
guarantees exist for the compatibility of the way in which pluralistic legal systems 
conceive of their mutual relations. Yet, the legal systems occupying European 
constitutional space have adopted various techniques to reduce the probability of 
clashes, while not relinquishing their final say. In this chapter, the perspective of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) will be left aside and the discussion 
focused on the way EU and member states’ fundamental rights laws, respectively, 
define their mutual relationship. 
In its landmark decisions in the 1960s – in particular van Gend en Loos and 
Costa v Enel 10  – the CJEU declared Community law’s independence from both 
(general) international law and member states’ municipal law. It also specified 
                                                        
10 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; Case C-6/64 Flaminio 
Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 585. 
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Community law’s relationship to member state law through the principles of direct 
effect and primacy. As the well-known and often-recited (hi)story tells us, especially 
the principle of primacy was destined to meet rather widespread resistance among 
member state legal actors, before it was gradually accepted. Still, the acceptance of EU 
law’s primacy by key national legal actors, such as constitutional courts, has never been 
unconditional. Through constitutional provisions and the rulings of constitutional or 
supreme courts, member state legal systems have articulated the principles which 
govern their relationship to transnational, EU law. The German Constitutional Court is 
the most important national interlocutor of the CJEU; this justifies letting it articulate 
the following perspective of member state fundamental rights law.11 The German court 
has formulated the conditionality of EU law’s primacy in terms of three types of review 
available to contest the constitutionality of national measures based on EU law: ultra 
vires review, fundamental rights review and an identity review. 
Through the accessibility of ultra vires review, the Court claims ultimate 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz jurisdiction; the final competence to decide, for the purposes of 
defending the German constitution, whether a particular Union action has been taken 
within Union competences. The preconditions of fundamental rights review are defined 
through the Solange doctrine. Finally, identity review protects Germany’s constitutional 
identity even beyond the area covered by fundamental rights review. 12 These three 
forms of review point to the three main problem fields where EU and national 
fundamental rights law may clash:[bl] 
- the extension of EU fundamental rights review with regard to national 
measures; 
- the level of protection offered by EU fundamental rights law; 
- respect for Member States’ constitutional identity.[/list] 
Heeding the lessons of legal perspectivism, all three fields of potential friction should 
be examined from the point of view of both EU and national fundamental rights law. 
And, as is the case with legal pluralism in general, two alternative approaches exist: 
one putting emphasis on latent or overt conflicts and the other on interlegality. 
                                                        
11 Daniel Thym, ‘Attack or retreat? Evolving themes and strategies of the judicial dialogue between the 
German Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice’ in Monica Claes and others (eds), 
Constitutional Conversations in Europe (Cambridge: Intersentia 2012). 
12 See from the quite extensive literature on the three types of review Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Constitutional 
review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the relationship between the German Constitutional 
Court and the EU Court of Justice’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 9. The emphasis in Payandeh’s analysis lies on 
the ultra vires review. 
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[b]2.2 The Extension of EU Fundamental Rights Review 
 
If in the 1960s the CJEU defined through its rulings Community law’s position in 
relation to member state and international law, the horizontal articles of the Charter 
attempt to achieve a similar positioning for EU fundamental rights law with regard to 
national law and the ECHR. Two things must be kept in mind when discussing these 
articles. First, the provisions of the horizontal articles cannot be detached from the 
doctrinal elaboration by the CJEU of fundamental rights law or (other) general 
principles of EU law. Second, the articles should be treated as contributions to a 
constitutional discourse where not only other EU bodies but member state 
constitutional actors, too, participate. The provisions are moves in an ongoing dialogue 
between EU and member state constitutional actors.13 
Article 51(1) of the Charter addresses the first problem field in the relations 
between EU and national fundamental rights law: the applicability of EU fundamental 
rights law to national measures. Where EU fundamental rights law is applicable, 
national courts are supposed to act as instruments of EU review: in accordance with the 
principle of primacy, national courts are supposed to set aside national in favour of EU 
fundamental rights law. According to Article 51(1), the Charter is addressed to the 
member states when these ‘are implementing Union law’. 
Article 52(7) of the Charter grants the explanations relating to the Charter explicit 
and for EU law exceptional source value.14 The explanations concerning Article 51(1) 
refer to pre-Lisbon case law, implying that the Charter expression ‘implementing Union 
law’ should be assigned a meaning equivalent to ‘acting in the scope of EU law’ in case 
law on fundamental rights principles. 15  This premise has been confirmed by post-
Lisbon case law, most notably Åkerberg Fransson. 
                                                        
13 Diverse aspects of this dialogue are discussed in the contributions in Claes and others (n 11). 
14 In, e.g., Åklagaren v Åkerberg Fransson, the CJEU explicitly invokes the explanations, Case C-617/10 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:280, para 20. 
 
15 As regards the Member States, it follows unambiguously from the case law of the Court of Justice that 
the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the 
member states when they act in the scope of Union law, see Case C-5/88 Wachauf v Budesamt füe 
Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609; Case C-260/89 ERT v DEP [1991] ECR I-2925; Case 
C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I-7493. 
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The pre-Lisbon case law referred to in Åkerberg Fransson16 indicates that the two 
main situations where national measures come under EU fundamental rights review 
are, first, where member states are implementing an obligation imposed by EU law and, 
second, when they are – in a justified way – derogating from such an obligation. In the 
literature, implementation of EU law is sometimes further differentiated into two sub-
cases: first, where member states are fulfilling an express mandate laid down by EU 
law and, second, where they act on an option provided by EU law. Åkerberg Fransson 
took the argument in the second sub-case rather far. The CJEU considered itself 
competent to examine whether national legislation on tax penalties and tax evasion, 
applied to providing false information concerning VAT, was compatible with the ne bis 
in idem principle laid down in Article 50 of the Charter. The Court disregarded the fact 
that national legislation was not adopted for the purposes of transposing Directive 
2006/112 on the common system of value added tax; 17  to show the necessary 
connection to EU law it was sufficient that ‘its application is designed to penalise an 
infringement of that directive and is therefore intended to implement the obligation 
imposed on the Member States by the Treaty to impose effective penalties for conduct 
prejudicial to the financial interests of the European Union’ (paras 25–28). 
 
Constitutional turbulence in some member states has induced proposals to stretch 
Union fundamental rights jurisdiction over national measures beyond the limits 
established by pre-Lisbon jurisprudence on fundamental rights principles and post-
Lisbon case law on Article 51(1) of the Charter). A more liberal reading of Article 
51(1), which would extend the Charter’s applicability to autonomous member state 
action, appears to collide with formidable doctrinal obstacles. Both Article 6(1) of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Article 51(2) of the Charter, manifesting the 
principles of conferral (Article 5(3) TEU) and subsidiarity (Article 5(4) TEU) invite a 
strict interpretation of Article 51(1). Consequently, doctrinal support for general Union 
fundamental rights competence has been sought elsewhere in the Treaties. Favourite 
Treaty anchorages for comprehensive fundamental rights review have been provisions 
                                                        
16 The Court mentioned Case C-260/89 ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, para 42; Case C-299/95 Kremzow 
[1997] ECR I-2629, para 15; Case C-309/96 Annibaldi [2007] ECR I-7493, para 13; Case C-94/00 
Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, para 25; Case C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] ECR I-10369, para 34; 
Case C-256/11 Dereci and Others [2011] ECR I-11315, para 72; and Case C-27/11 Vinkov v Nachalnik 
Administrativno-nakazatelna deynost ECLI:EU:C:2012:326, para 58. 
17 Council Directive (EC) 2006/112 on the common system of value added tax [2006] OJ L347/1. 
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on European citizenship and, after Lisbon, Article 2 TEU on the value basis of the 
Union. 
Armin von Bogdandy et al. 18 argue that by attaching fundamental rights to 
European citizenship, judicial protection can be provided for the values enumerated in 
Article 2 TEU, which, the authors concede, are not justiciable as such. Judicial 
protection, tapping the vigilance of individuals, would complement the polit ical 
mechanism set out in Article 7 TEU. As member states are expected to respect 
foundational values in all their activities, Union fundamental rights review would be 
brought to cover all member state activity, that is, purely internal domains as well. 
 To achieve such a result, two argumentative moves should be vindicated: first, 
a redefinition of EU fundamental rights as rights of European citizens and, second, 
attachment of fundamental rights qua citizenship rights to the values enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU. As regards the first move, Bogdandy et al. build on recent citizenship 
jurisprudence, especially Ruiz Zambrano. Here the Court ruled that Article 20 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on European citizenship: 
[quotation]is to be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a Member State from 
refusing a third country national upon whom his minor children, who are 
European Union citizens, are dependent, a right of residence in the Member 
State of residence and nationality of those children, and from refusing to grant 
a work permit to that third country national, in so far as such decisions deprive 
those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching 
to the status of European Union citizen (emphasis added).19[/quotation] 
Bogdandy et al. draw quite far-reaching generalizing conclusions from Ruiz Zambrano. 
First, Ruiz Zambrano is alleged to show that European citizenship can be invoked in a 
member state in a purely internal situation with no cross-border elements. Second, ‘the 
substance of the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen’ is claimed to 
refer to EU fundamental rights in general so that Ruiz Zambrano would have confirmed 
their character as citizenship rights. 
 The first conclusion concerning EU citizenship’s relevance in purely internal 
situations may already need specification. However, what is more pertinent now is to 
                                                        
18 Armin von Bogdandy et al., ‘Reverse Solange – protecting the essence of fundamental rights against 
EU member states’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 489; Daniel Sarmiento, ‘The EU’s constitutional core’ in 
Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and 
European Integration (Cambridge: Intersentia 2013). 
19 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177, para 45. 
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problematise the link between citizenship and fundamental rights, allegedly forged by 
Ruiz Zambrano. Articles 20–23 TFEU contain explicit provisions on the rights deriving 
from the status of EU citizen, and the Charter includes a specific Chapter on Citizens’ 
rights (Title V). As is well-known, the CJEU has derived auxiliary social rights from 
explicitly stipulated citizenship rights, in particular rights to mobility and residence. 
But no case law evidence exists which would point to a constitutional connection 
between citizenship and EU fundamental rights in general. Nothing in Ruiz Zambrano 
intimates that ‘rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen’ would cover 
EU fundamental rights as a whole and not only the rights explicitly derived from 
European citizenship in Articles 20–23 TFEU and Title V of the Charter, 
complemented by auxiliary social rights. Bogdandy et al. are correct in pointing out the 
affinity of citizenship and fundamental rights in constitutional theory and history. But 
this does not suffice to establish a connection between the two in EU ‘surface-level’ 
constitutional law.20 To define European citizenship in terms of fundamental rights and 
to claim on that ground jurisdiction for the Union in purely internal fundamental rights 
violations would involve a huge leap in the CJEU’s incrementally built citizenship 
jurisprudence. It would also require surmounting doctrinal hurdles so high that its 
probability is very low. 
 The provisions and explanations concerning applicability of the Charter, which 
have curbed proposals to stretch the reach of EU fundamental rights review by an 
imaginative interpretation of Article 51(1) of the are not directly pertinent for 
constructions which try to find their ‘institutional support’ elsewhere in the Treaties; 
indeed, to escape these limitations is a central backdrop to reorientation of the search 
for solid doctrinal ground for the Union’s general fundamental rights competence. But 
the principle of conferral, explicitly set out in Article 5(2) TEU, certainly is relevant, 
as is the general worry of many member states of the EU taking steps in a federal 
direction through the CJEU’s fundamental rights jurisprudence. Proposals now under 
discussion do pay heed to these worries to some extent: the function of the Solange part 
of the proposal by von Bogdandy et al. EU fundamental rights review, grounded in 
citizenship, would be confined to protecting the essence of rights. This limitation would 
                                                        
20 In its case law subsequent to Ruiz Zambrano, the CJEU has abstained from abstained from extending 
‘the rights attaching to the status of European Union citizen’ to EU fundamental rights in general. See 
Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-3375 and Dereci (n 16), which both invoked the issue of respect 
for family life. 
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correspond to the ‘substance’ of citizenship rights which Ruiz Zambrano declared 
protected. The ‘essence’ of fundamental rights would also equal human rights as basic 
values, such as they are conceived of in Article 2 TEU. Moreover, this notion would 
bring reverse Solange in congruence with the doctrine of inviolability of the essence of 
fundamental rights; a doctrine adopted in Article 52(1) of the Charter, and adhered to 
by the ECtHR, as well as national systems of constitutional review. 
 Second, only systematic violations of the essence of fundamental rights would 
be justiciable. The assumption would be that member state review mechanisms are able 
to deal with infringements, and only if this expectation were rebutted and infringements 
received a systematic nature, would EU fundamental rights review be competent to 
interfere; hence, the term ‘reverse Solange’. 
 The weak point in the doctrinal argument remains the connection between 
citizenship and fundamental rights, for which no ‘institutional support’ exists in either 
Treaty provisions or Ruiz Zambrano or other case law of the CJEU. Furthermore, in the 
hybrid European constitutional space, doctrinal considerations within EU law, however 
convincing they might be, are not enough to ground such a significant constitutional 
change as extension of Union fundamental rights jurisdiction to member state 
autonomous activity. Such a discursive move by the CJEU would still need acceptance 
by other main participants in European constitutional discourse, in particular national 
constitutional or supreme courts and the ECtHR. The German Constitutional Court has 
been quick to react to what it has considered threatening signs of the CJEU expanding 
its fundamental rights jurisdiction and to give a reminder of potential use of its ultra 
vires review. 
 In Honeywell,21  the German Constitutional Court responded to the CJEU’s 
ruling in Mangold.22 The complainant had claimed that the CJEU in Mangold had 
transgressed the boundaries of interpretation of Community law in a manner which was 
no longer covered by the competences of the Community. In the end, the Constitutional 
Court found that the CJEU had not exceeded the borderline beyond which ultra vires 
                                                        
21 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/106. 
22 Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981. The judgment dates from the pre-Lisbon time and was 
not based on the Charter but on Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. The CJEU held it to be the responsibility of the national court 
to guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principle of non-discrimination in respect of age and to 
set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with Community law, even where the period 
prescribed for transposition of the directive had not yet expired. In the post-Lisbon Kücükdeveci, the 
Court confirmed prohibition of discrimination based on age as a general principle of Union law and 
referred as grounds to Article 21(1) of the Charter. Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] ECR I-365. 
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review would be available. However, the Court’s detailed discussion of the 
applicability of ultra vires review to fundamental rights case law is a clear reminder to 
the CJEU that its German counterpart would not approve expansion of European 
jurisdiction over the limits set in Article 51(1)–(2) of the Charter. Honeywell and 
Mangold concerned prohibition of age discrimination as a general principle of EU law. 
Invoking Article 51(2) of the Charter, the Constitutional Court pointed out that ‘even if 
they guarantee the protection of fundamental rights at Union level, general principles 
may not expand the field of influence of Union law over and above the existing 
competences of the Union or indeed establish new tasks and competences’ (para 78).23 
 Another reminder followed in early 2013. In a decision issued less than two 
months after the CJEU ruling in Åkerberg Fransson, the Constitutional Court held that 
the German ‘Counter-Terrorism Database Act pursues nationally determined objectives 
which can affect the functioning of the legal relationships under EU law merely 
indirectly’. Consequently, the Court argued, ‘European fundamental rights are from the 
outset not applicable’. The Court expressly emphasised that the CJEU’s decision in 
Åkerberg Fransson does not change this conclusion. In line with Honeywell, the Court 
characterised European and national fundamental rights review as a cooperative 
relationship. From this it inferred that Åkerberg Fransson ‘must not be read in a way 
that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered the protection 
and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the member states in a way that 
questioned the identity of the Basic Law’s constitutional order’.24 
 It is highly improbable that the CJEU would discount the German Constitutional 
Court’s message, deliberately induce ultra vires review in member states and take the 
risk of an overt constitutional conflict. Furthermore, there is no reason to presume that 
national constitutional or supreme courts would be more receptive to general EU 
fundamental rights review of a reverse Solange type.25 In addition to reactions from 
                                                        
23 See on Honeywell and its significance, Payandeh (n 12). 
24 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1215/07. See the Court’s Press release no 31/2013 of 24 April 2013. See also the 
editorial comment ‘Ultra vires – has the Bundesverfassungsgericht shown its teeth?’ (2013) 50 CML 
Rev 925. 
25  Interestingly enough, in its Lisbon ruling the German Constitutional Court, as if anticipating 
subsequent doctrinal debates, renounced reliance on Article 2 TEU as a basis for the Union’s alleged 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz: ‘As primacy by virtue of constitutional empowerment is retained, the values 
codified in Article 2 Lisbon TEU, whose legal character does not require clarification here, may in the 
case of a conflict of laws not claim primacy over the constitutional identity of the Member States, which 
is protected by Article 4.2 first sentence Lisbon TEU and is constitutionally safeguarded by the identity 
review pursuant to Article 23.1 third sentence in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic Law. The 
values of Article 2 Lisbon TEU, which are contained in part as principles in the current Article 6.1 TEU, 
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member state courts, the CJEU would certainly heed the likely rejoinder from 
Strasbourg as well. By adopting a reverse Solange doctrine, the CJEU would contest 
the ECtHR’s position as the transnational court with general fundamental rights 
jurisdiction. This would most probably provoke a counter-move by the ECtHR. Radical 
pluralists’ nightmare would come true: a fundamental conflict of authority would break 
out among the key judicial actors in European constitutional space. 
 
Differing from reverse Solange, advocated by Bogdandy et al., horizontal Solange 
entrusts general fundamental rights review, extending to internal member state action, 
to the courts of other member states. If reverse Solange is intended to influence future 
case law, horizontal Solange is claimed to have already been confirmed by the CJEU. 
 Iris Canor26 grounds this claim on the CJEU’s ruling in N.S.27 In this ruling, the 
Court first stated that the discretionary power which the Dublin II Regulation28 leaves 
to member states forms an integral part of the Common European Asylum System. 
When a member state exercises this power and decides whether or not to examine an 
application which is not its responsibility according to the criteria of the Regulation, it 
implements Union law for the purposes of Article 6 TEU and Article 51 of the Charter 
(paras 65–68). According to the Court, the Common European Asylum System is built 
on the principle of mutual confidence. The underlying assumption is that participating 
States observe fundamental rights and that the member states can have confidence in 
each other in this regard (para 78). However, the assumption is rebuttable. The system 
‘may, in practice, experience major operational problems in a given Member State, 
meaning that there is a substantial risk that asylum seekers may, when transferred to 
that Member State, be treated in a manner incompatible with their fundamental rights’ 
(paras 80–81). Still, not any infringement of a fundamental right by the member state 
responsible suffices to prevent the transfer of an asylum seeker. Only: 
[quotation]if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic 
flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants 
                                                        
do not provide the European union of integration with Kompetenz-Kompetenz, so that the principle of 
conferral also continues to apply in this respect.’ Para 332. 
26 Iris Canor, ‘My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange: “An ever closer distrust among the peoples of 
Europe”’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 383. 
27 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and Others ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 
28  Council Regulation No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by 
a third-country national [2003] OJ L50/1. 
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in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, 
within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to 
the territory of that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible with that 
provision’ (para 86).[/quotation] 
If such grounds exist, EU fundamental rights law obliges a member state not to transfer 
the asylum seeker to the member state responsible. 
 Thus, according to N.S., EU fundamental rights law imposes on member states, 
including their courts, an obligation to monitor compliance with that law in other 
member states. Yet, the basic, though rebuttable, assumption guiding the member state 
action is that other member states respect the relevant fundamental rights; hence the 
term ‘horizontal Solange’. It is important to note that EU law is the applicable law with 
regard to both the member state considering the transfer of an asylum seeker and the 
member state responsible. We are dealing with the application and observance of EU 
fundamental rights law in two member states and not the horizontal relation between 
national fundamental rights laws. The term ‘horizontal Solange’ is justified in the sense 
that a member state’s authorities are monitoring another member state’s fundamental 
rights record. But, actually, these authorities are exercising ‘vertical’ EU fundamental 
rights review. 
 Can one derive from N.S. a general doctrine of horizontal Solange and member 
states’ general obligation to watch over each other’s observance of EU fundamental 
rights? Canor answers in the affirmative. In her argument, two steps in particular would 
require ‘institutional support’ in N.S. or other CJEU case law. First, ‘systemic violation 
of core European fundamental rights’ in a member state would oblige other member 
states to suspend cooperation with that member state. It remains unclear what kind of 
cooperation this obligation would cover. Canor’s focus is on member states’ obligation 
to refuse on certain conditions cooperation stipulated by EU secondary legislation – in 
N.S. by Regulation 343/2003 – but she does not spell out the exact reach of horizontal 
Solange. Would the obligation preclude other member states from applying the EU law 
principle of mutual recognition, which in some fields is acknowledged in political and 
in others in judicial legislation? It is difficult to find in N.S. backing for a general 
Solange doctrine applicable to member state cooperation beyond the specific 
constellation under Regulation 343/2003 where a member state makes use of its 
discretionary power of either deciding itself an asylum application or transferring the 
applicant to the member state responsible. 
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It is true, though, that in N.S. the CJEU invokes the more general principle of 
mutual confidence which implies the presumption of member states’ complying with 
fundamental rights. One could argue that this would vindicate generalising horizontal 
Solange to cover at least all instances of mutual recognition underpinned by this 
principle. Horizontal Solange would be especially relevant in the former third-pillar 
area of freedom, security and justice. Still, as regards for instance the European Arrest 
Warrant, the CJEU has not invoked such a general doctrine but has relied on the explicit 
provisions of the Framework Decision on mandatory or optional non-execution of such 
a warrant.29 However, in the absence of such provisions, a horizontal Solange-type 
argument might be possible. 
 The other controversial argumentative step leads from EU law-related to 
autonomous member state action. N.S. concerned member state action and cooperation 
in a fundamental rights sensitive field regulated by EU law. Not only the decision 
making of the member state where the asylum seeker was present but also the actions 
or non-actions of the member state responsible which rebutted the presumption of 
compliance with fundamental rights were located within the scope of EU law: at issue 
were systematic flaws in asylum procedure and reception of asylum seekers, leading to 
inhuman or degrading treatment. From this, there is a long way to go to reach the 
conclusion that member states would have an obligation to monitor each other’s general 
fundamental rights record, regardless of whether or not the alleged flaws are related to 
EU law or the cooperation at issue. 
 
[b]2.3  Level of Protection 
 
The second issue of possible friction between EU and member state fundamental rights 
law, determining the level of protection, should also be examined from both 
perspectives. In EU law, Article 53 of the Charter addresses the issue in relation both 
to member state constitutions and the ECHR. In both relations, Article 53 intimates that 
in its field of application, the Charter only defines the bottom line of protection: 
 
[quotation]Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their 
                                                        
29 See Case C-396/11 Radu ECLI:EU:C:2013:39. See also Case C-306/09 I.B. [2010] ECR I-10341; and 
Case C-399/11 Melloni ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
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respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by 
international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, 
including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.30[/quotation] 
 
Melloni has added a significant qualification to the application of Article 53 of the 
Charter with regard to member state fundamental rights law. The main legal issue in 
Melloni was whether a member state could refuse to execute a European Arrest Warrant 
‘in order to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the defence 
guaranteed by its constitution’. The protection offered by the national constitution 
exceeded the level offered by the Charter with which the Framework Decision, 
according to the CJEU’s judgment, was in harmony. The CJEU firmly rejected the 
interpretation which the national court had envisaged and which would give ‘general 
authorisation to a Member State to apply the standard of protection of fundamental 
rights guaranteed by its constitution when that standard is higher than that deriving from 
the Charter and, where necessary, to give it priority over the application of provisions 
of EU law’ (para 56). The Court argues that the national court’s reading of Article 53 
‘would undermine the principle of the primacy of EU law inasmuch as it would allow 
a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with the 
Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s 
constitution’ (para 58). The Court characterises the principle of primacy as an essential 
feature of EU law, which provides that ‘rules of national law, even of a constitutional 
order, cannot be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on the territory of 
that State’ (para 59). The Court presents a new formulation of the normative contents 
of Article 53: 
[quotation]Article 53 of the Charter confirms that, where an EU legal act calls 
for national implementing measures, national authorities and courts remain free 
to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that 
the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, 
and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised 
(para 60 – emphasis added).[/quotation] 
                                                        
30 In addition to Article 53, the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR is governed by the 
interpretative principle laid down in Article 52(4): ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention.’ However, ‘this provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’. 
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Melloni might be labelled a special case, due to the fact that the Framework Decision 
includes explicit provisions on member states’ rights to refuse a European Arrest 
Warrant and that these were expressly designed to heed fair trial concerns. However, 
the Court formulated its reading of Article 53 of the Charter in general terms, with the 
clear intention of articulating a principle with general applicability. Daniel Sarmiento 
portrays reference to the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law as an exceptional 
remedy; a last-resort safety measure for extraordinary situations.31 Yet, the way Melloni 
defines the primacy of the principle of primacy with regard to the member state right 
to enforce higher national standards appears to deprive Article 53 of the Charter of 
much of its relevance. Situations addressed by Article 53 are by definition situations of 
overlapping jurisdiction where the principle of primacy is relevant. Thus, one might 
ask, when can national fundamental rights law with a higher level of protection actually 
trump EU law? In his Opinion in Melloni, Advocate General Bot points to a situation 
where that could be the case: where the member state can invoke the EU constitutional 
principle of respect for member state constitutional identity (Article 4(2) TEU).32 
Second, Åkerberg Fransson demonstrates that in the CJEU’s view the pertinence of the 
primacy of EU law varies, depending on the degree of discretion EU law leaves to 
national measures. Following Sarmiento, one could speak here of complete and partial 
determination by EU law.33 However, in para 29 of Melloni the Court intimates that 
even in situations of only partial determination, the principle of primacy may override 
national fundamental rights autonomy.34 
 A third exception to the principle of primacy may derive from the position of 
the ECHR in a member state legal order. If the member state at issue has incorporated 
the ECHR, national fundamental rights law may indirectly benefit from the provisions 
                                                        
31 Daniel Sarmiento, ‘Who’s afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the new 
framework of fundamental rights protection in Europe’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 1267, 1295. 
32 However, according to AG Bot, this was not the situation in Melloni, and the Member State itself had 
conceded that its national identity was not involved. Melloni (n 29), Opinion of AG Bot, paras 139–42. 
33 Sarmiento (n 31) 1289. 
34 ‘… where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental rights are complied 
with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not 
entirely determined by European Union law, implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of 
the Charter, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by 
the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby 
compromised’. See also on the relationship between Article 4(2) TEU and Article 53 of the Charter the 
analysis in Aida Torres Pérez, ‘Constitutional identity and fundamental rights: The intersection between 
articles 4(2) TEU and 53 Charter’ in Arnaiz and Llivina (n 18). 
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of the Charter on the relationship of Charter rights with the ECHR. No principle of 
primacy guides this relationship, or justifies deviating from the wording of Article 53 
or the interpretative principle set out in Article 52(3) of the Charter.35 Finally, member 
states are free to apply higher national standards when derogating from EU law; that is, 
in the second main situation where member states are deemed to act within the scope 
of EU law for the purposes of EU fundamental rights protection.36 
 
Reverse and horizontal Solange adopt the perspective of EU fundamental rights law 
and are expansionist by nature: both proposals aim at extending the scope of EU review 
over national measures. By contrast, the original Solange embraced the point of view 
of the national constitution and was defensive by nature: it aimed at safeguarding 
national fundamental rights protection from the threat perceived to derive from the EU 
law principle of primacy. The Solange saga is intimately intertwined with the 
development of EU fundamental rights law: what, from the perspective of German 
constitutional law appears as the history of the Solange doctrine, tells us from the point 
of view of EU law about the consolidation of its fundamental rights dimension. 
 In Solange I, issued on 29 May 1974,37 the German Constitutional Court argued 
that Article 24 of the Basic Law, the then constitutional basis for transferring sovereign 
rights to inter-state institutions, did not authorise amending the fundamental structure 
of the Basic law, the basis of its identity, through the legislation of an inter-state 
institution. The part dealing with fundamental rights is an alienable, essential feature of 
the Basic Law and part of its constitutional structure. The Court pointed out that the 
Community still lacked ‘a codified catalogue of fundamental rights, the substance of 
which is reliably and unambiguously fixed for the future in the same way as the 
substance of the Basic Law’. Consequently, the Court avowed that it would review the 
compatibility of Community law, relevant to the decision of a German court, in light of 
national fundamental rights ‘as long as the integration process has not progressed so far 
that Community law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a 
                                                        
35 ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall 
be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection’. 
36 See Nik de Boer, ‘Addressing rights divergences under the Charter: Melloni’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 
1083, 1096. 
37 BVerfGE 37, 271 2 BvL 52/71. 
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parliament and of settled validity, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue 
of fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law’. However, before filing a reference 
with the Constitutional Court, the court at issue should obtain a ruling of the ECJ in the 
preliminary reference procedure under Article 177 TEEC (present Article 267 TFEU). 
 Solange II, issued on 22 October 1986,38 reaffirmed that the Basic Law does not 
allow conferral on international institutions of a power to encroach on the identity of 
the prevailing constitutional order of the Federal Republic and that fundamental rights 
principles are an essential part of this order. However, in Solange II the Court recounted 
the progress achieved in Community fundamental rights law and concluded that it could 
now revise the position of Solange I. The Court formulated a new Solange doctrine, 
with deference to EU fundamental rights review and non-application of national review 
as the – rebuttable – starting point.39 
 Since the issuance of Solange II, the fundamental rights dimension of EU law 
has been further consolidated, the latest stage consisting of conferral of legal effect on 
the Charter in Lisbon and post-Lisbon case law, with Åkerberg Fransson and Melloni 
as important recent landmarks. The national concerns that lay behind the Solange 
rulings are largely a matter of the past. The principal worries of member state 
interlocutors in ongoing constitutional dialogue no longer relate to the general level of 
Union fundamental rights protection but to the two other fields of potential friction: 
extension of EU fundamental rights review and respect for member state constitutional 
identity. For member state constitutional actors, the main problems no longer derive 
from underdevelopment of EU law’s fundamental rights dimension but, rather, EU law 
exceeding its legitimate limits. 
 
[b]2.4 Respect for Constitutional Identity 
                                                        
38 BVerfGE 73, 339 2 BvR 197/83. 
39 ‘In view of those developments it must be held that, so long as the European Communities, in particular 
European Court case law, generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights as against the 
sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection 
of fundamental rights required un-conditionally by the Basic Law, and in so far as they generally 
safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer 
exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation cited as the 
legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and it will no longer re-view such legislation by the standard of the fundamental 
rights contained in the Basic Law …’ 
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Every legal system not only defines its relations to other legal systems but also tries to 
defend its identity. Accordingly, member state constitutional and supreme courts have 
articulated their reservations concerning EU law’s claim of primacy as inviolability of 
their constitutional identity; the justification and the exact terms may vary but the main 
idea is approximately the same. Again, the German Constitutional Court is a 
representative mouthpiece for the member state perspective.40 
 From the very outset, identity review and fundamental rights review have been 
closely connected in the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court. Solange I 
and Solange II justified fundamental rights review with reference to the preservation of 
German constitutional identity. In the Lisbon ruling, which includes the most detailed 
elaboration of identity review, protecting fundamental rights principles finds its place 
under this heading, too.41 
 In line with the dialogical development of EU fundamental rights law, national 
constitutional and supreme courts have held the initiative in the dialogue resulting in 
Lisbon in the adoption of respect for member state constitutional identity as a principle 
of EU constitutional law. 42  Through Article 4(2) the EU constitutional legislator 
acknowledged the identity qualification which national constitutional actors had 
attached to acceptance of EU law’s claim of primacy. Continuing the pluralistic 
constitutional discourse, the German Constitutional Court took notice of the speech act 
of the Union constitutional legislator. In its Lisbon ruling, the Court assigned identity 
                                                        
40 As a brief summary of other constitutional courts’ jurisprudence see Armin von Bogdandy and Stephan 
Schill, ‘Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for national identity under the Lisbon Treaty’ (2011) 48 
CML Rev 1417; Monica Claes, ‘National identity: Trump card or up for negotiations’ in Arnaiz and 
Llivina (n 18) 124. Especially on the case law of the new Central European member states see Wojciech 
Sadurski, ‘“Solange, Chapter 3”: Constitutional courts in Central Europe – democracy – European 
Union’ (2008) 14 ELR 1; Joël Rideau, ‘The case-law of the Polish, Hungarian and Czech Constitutional 
Courts on national identity and the “German model”’ in Arnaiz and Llivina (n 18). As a general review 
of member state constitutional law relating to the EU, see Christoph Grabenwarter, ‘National 
constitutional law relating to the European Union’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds), 
Principles of European Constitutional Law, 2nd edn (Oxford/Munich: Hart Publishing/CH Beck/ 2010). 
41 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para 249. As a succinct presentation of the German Constitutional Court’s 
jurisprudence on constitutional identity see Christian Tomuschat, ‘The defence of national identity by 
the German Constitutional Court’ in Arnaiz and Llivina (n 18). 
42  The Maastricht Treaty already contained a provision obliging the Union to respect the national 
identities of its Member States (article 6(4) TEU-Maastricht). Yet, as Claes, (n 40) 130, has 
demonstrated, the provision played but a minor role in pre-Lisbon case law. Only in Lisbon was a 
constitutional dimension expressly included in the national identity. According to Article 4(2) TEU-
Lisbon, ‘the Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and 
local self-government’. 
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review the task of securing that ‘the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity 
of the Basic Law’ is respected. The Court argued that ‘with progressing integration, the 
fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign Member States, which 
are recognised by Article 4(2) first sentence Lisbon TEU, cannot be safeguarded in any 
other way’, and concluded that ‘in this respect, the guarantee of national constitutional 
identity under constitutional and under Union law go hand in hand in the European 
legal area’.43 
 Thus, Article 4(2) TEU should be seen as a contribution to the ongoing dialogue 
between EU and member state constitutional actors. Of course, it does not by itself 
ensure that no future clashes over fundamental rights jurisdiction will arise; this would 
require an additional guarantee of the identity of the constitutional identities as 
interpreted by the CJEU and national constitutional actors. But no such guarantee 
exists. Still, through Article 4(2), the Union constitutional legislator has kept the 
channel for discussion open. Moreover, in two recent CJEU cases, the CJEU and its 
member state interlocutors have adopted a similar reading of national constitutional 
identity. If no guarantee for agreement exists, conflict is not inevitable, either.44 
In Sayn-Wittgenstein, the CJEU ‘accepted that, in the context of Austrian 
constitutional history, the Law on the abolition of the nobility, as an element of national 
identity, may be taken into consideration when a balance is struck between legitimate 
interests and the right of free movement of persons recognised under European Union 
law’ (para 83). What is significant for the present discussion is that the Court expressly 
evoked Article 4(2) TEU (para 92). In turn, in the proceedings in Melloni Attorney 
General Bot and the Spanish authorities agreed that the reading of the constitutional 
right to fair trial, adopted by the Spanish constitutional court and requiring a right to 
reopen a criminal case where the defendant has been sentenced in absentia, did not bear 
on Spanish constitutional identity.45 
 
                                                        
43 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, para 240. See also para 332, where the Court states ‘the constitutional identity 
of the Member States protected by Art 4(2) TEU and constitutionally safeguarded by the identity review’. 
44 A dialogical approach on the principle of respect for national constitutional identity has also been 
adopted by, e.g. Leonard F.M. Besselink, ‘National and constitutional identity before and after Lisbon’ 
(2010) 6 Utrecht Law Review 36, and von Bogdandy and Schill (n 40). 
45 Opinion of AG Bot in Melloni (n 29), paras 139–42. 
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The CJEU’s clinging to the principle of primacy in situations where a member state 
constitution offers a higher level of fundamental rights protection intimates that not 
only member states but the EU, too, keeps watch on its constitutional identity. Indeed, 
things could hardly be otherwise: for the EU legal system, too, guarding its 
constitutional identity is a precondition for preserving its independence. In Van Gend 
en Loos and Costa v Enel, the ECJ declared Community law’s independence in two 
directions: with regard to member state legal systems and (general) international law. 
Accordingly, constitutional identity may acquire at least partly different traits when 
invoked vis-à-vis international law or member state law. Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati 
have interpreted Kadi46 as confirmation of ‘a tendency discernible in earlier case law 
according to which the EU constitutional order consists of some core principles which 
may prevail over provisions of the Treaties and thus of written primary law’.47 Here the 
authors make specific reference to the position of the judgment that rights and duties 
arising from international agreements concluded before accession: 
[quotation]may in no circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that 
form part of the very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which 
is the protection of fundamental rights, including the review by the Community 
judicature of the lawfulness of Community measures as regards their 
consistency with those fundamental rights’ (para 304).[/quotation] 
This entails that foundational principles override the provisions in Article 351 TFEU 
(previously Article 307 TEC) which lay down that the Treaties do not affect rights and 
duties arising from international agreements concluded before accession. But Kadi can 
be read not only as a sign of an internal hierarchy in EU constitutional law but also as 
an assertion of constitutional identity vis-à-vis international law: the Court assessed an 
EU regulation implementing a decision of the UN Security Council in light of EU 
fundamental rights standards. 
 Doubts can be raised as to whether fundamental rights principles were part of 
the Community’s constitutional identity at the time when Community law made its 
declaration of independence through Van Gend en Loos and Costa v Enel. Still, 
                                                        
46 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
47 Allan Rosas and Lorna Armati, EU Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 2nd edn (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2012) 54. 
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constitutional identity is not only a relational but also a dynamic phenomenon. 
Subsequent development of EU fundamental rights law, culminating in explicit 
conferral of legal effect on the Charter in Lisbon, together with confirmation of the 
EU’s value basis in Article 2 TEU, lend credence to the assertion in Kadi and the 
conclusion drawn from it by Rosas and Armati. These authors leave open what else the 
EU constitutional identity might include.48 With regard to member state law, the two 
principles which in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v Enel accompanied Community law’s 
claim of autonomy, the principles of primacy and direct effect, certainly are an essential 
part of Union constitutional identity. These principles are inexorably linked to the two 
second-order principles which provide them with justification: namely, the efficacy and 
unity of EU law. Hence, the prevalence in Melloni of EU law’s primacy over the 
member state right to apply a higher national fundamental rights standard can also be 
understood as the CJEU defending the EU’s constitutional identity with regard to a 
member state.49 
 The CJEU’s assertion of the EU’s constitutional identity may give rise to a new 
type of conflict: a clash between Union and member state constitutional identity. The 
CJEU may agree with member state authorities that a particularity of national 
fundamental rights law forms part of the member state’s constitutional identity and, 
hence, falls under the obligation imposed on the CJEU by Article 4(2) TEU. Yet, the 
CJEU might conclude that protection of Union constitutional identity overrides respect 
for national constitutional identity so that, for the sake of the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of EU law, Union fundamental rights standards should be applied instead 
of national ones. Respect for member state constitutional identity may not always trump 
the principles included in the EU’s constitutional identity. 
 
[b]2.5 Dialectic of Constitutional Diversity and Uniformity 
 
In the horizontal relations among member states, the recognition by EU constitutional 
law of national constitutional identities implies recognition of constitutional diversity 
as well: member states may display significant differences in their constitutional 
                                                        
48 Sarmiento (n 18), defines the EU’s constitutional core and legal identity through the three normative 
ideals of democracy, rights and solidarity, to which especially Articles 2–4 TEU give expression. 
49 See also Sarmiento (n 31) 1295, who states that ‘in line with its national counterparts, Luxembourg 
has powerful reasons to impose its own counter-limits, whose purpose is, in the last instance and in line 
with previous case law, to guarantee the autonomy of EU law’. 
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cultures, differences which are instrumental to their distinct constitutional identities. 
However, Treaty law manifests, not only diversity of constitutional identities, but also 
an assumption of common constitutional traditions. Such an assumption underlies both 
Article 6(3) TEU, which indicates member states’ common constitutional traditions as 
a source of fundamental rights as general EU law principles, and Article 52(4) of the 
Charter, which defines the role of these traditions in the interpretation of Charter rights. 
Furthermore, article 2 TEU postulates a common value basis for both member state and 
Union fundamental rights law. The Preamble to the Charter manifests the dialectic of 
uniformity and diversity in clear terms. The Union is declared to be grounded in 
common values but, by the same token, to respect cultural diversity among member 
states. 
The idea of the multilayered nature of law in general and constitutional law in 
particular illustrates how constitutional diversity and uniformity can be reconciled. 
Fundamental rights law can be examined at three different levels. The surface level 
consists of explicit constitutionally relevant normative material, such as constitutional 
regulations, constitutionally relevant case law and doctrinal positions presented and 
defended by constitutional scholars. At this level, constitutional law in force can be 
understood as an always temporary result of an ongoing constitutional discourse, where 
the principal participants are the constitutional legislature, the constitutional court(s) 
and other bodies of constitutional review as well as constitutional scholars. 50  The 
surface level constitutional law is backed up by constitutional culture, which informs 
the Vorverständnis of constitutional actors and, thus, plays a vital role in constitutional 
discourse, responsible for surface-level turbulence. Distinct constitutional systems 
possess distinct constitutional cultures but they may still share a common core which 
justifies talk of constitutional deep culture. What is included in particular constitutional 
cultures and how the unifying deep culture is defined is always a matter of 
interpretation, and the interpretation is never normatively innocent. Article 2 TEU can 
be understood as a reading of the deep culture which is supposed to unite the 
constitutional cultures of the member states as well as that of the Union. 
We can reverse our examination, adopt a bottom-up view and portray the multi-
layered nature of fundamental rights law in terms of a relation of specification. In 
                                                        
50 In the EU, analysis of constitutional discourse is more intricate than in nation states, due to the 
composite character of both the constitutional legislature and the mechanism. 
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constitutional deep culture, such as that depicted in Article 2 TEU, fundamental rights, 
as well as other central principles of a democratic Rechtsstaat, are present as general 
normative ideas. In different legal cultures, these principles are interpreted in different 
ways. Anglo-American legal culture perhaps emphasises liberty rights more than the 
Roman Germanic legal cultures of Continental Europe, where social, economic and 
cultural rights represent a graver threat to the unchallenged dominance of the former. 
Legal cultures show differences even in mechanisms for protection of rights; for 
example, in the division of labour between the legislature and the courts. The process 
of specification is brought to its end at the surface level in constitutional provisions and 
other regulations, court decisions and standpoints presented by constitutional scholars. 
 Diversity of constitutional identities is related to the differentiation of 
constitutional cultures in European constitutional space. In my three-level scheme, this 
diversity is evidently a phenomenon of the middle level, with its background in 
divergent national historical trajectories and experiences which for instance explain the 
varying emphases among fundamental rights in the member states. Diversity does not 
exclude resemblances in national constitutional identities and cultures; existence of 
common constitutional traditions as alluded to in Article 6(3) TEU and Article 52(4) of 
the Charter. Both particular and unifying features are supported by a common 
supportive constitutional deep culture, which they interpret and specify against a partly 
divergent and partly comparable historical backdrop. Common deep culture also makes 
it at least possible to arrive in the Union and the member states at compatible definitions 
of the reach of EU fundamental rights review, the level of protection of fundamental 
rights and constitutional identities. Common deep culture also facilitates such 
interlegality as the ongoing cross-boundary constitutional discourse in the hybrid 
European constitutional space; a discourse where multiple transnational and national 
constitutional actors participate. 
Tokens of interlegality demonstrate that a discursive way exists to prevent 
clashes of authority the possibility of which cannot be negated under conditions of 
pluralism. In turn, interlegality among member states mitigates problems for EU law 
which otherwise would arise from the diversity of member state laws. All in all, 
interlegality, arising from and facilitated by common constitutional deep culture, goes 
a long way to compensate for lack of a second-order principle or arbiter for pacifying 
conflicts in European constitutional space. 
 
